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trary to the policy that the privilege against self-incrimination is to be
liberally construed and applied. 2 I Regardless of the manner in which
an attorney obtains possession of tax records and documents, it should
be recognized that he possesses them constructively for his client in
order to prepare his client's defense.
Of course, it must be noted, the court was not forced to overrule
White in order to reach a proper and just decision in Kasmir. Hope-
fully, when the Fifth Circuit is again faced with a situation in which
the taxpayer has not actually touched the documents en route to his
attorney, it will acknowledge that such a slight distinction from Kas-
mir does not justify denial of the taxpayer's privilege. Today, a careful
attorney can insure that his client's privilege will not be jeopardized by
involving the taxpayer in any transfer of documents to him.
The Kasmir decision is an important one, 22 necessary to the
safeguard of constitutional guarantees and protection of the attorney-
client relationship. The Fifth Circuit has recognized that the Supreme
Court's pronouncements in Couch do not defeat the taxpayer's claim of
privilege with respect to documents in his attorney's possession, but
rather, serve to strengthen that claim.2 3 It is to be hoped that other
circuits will follow the Kasmir court in its protection of the rights of
taxpayers.
ELLEN R. GERSHOW
DISCLOSURE OF CLIENT CONFIDENCES BY SECURITIES
ATTORNEY NAMED AS A DEFENDANT IN A CIVIL
ACTION DOES NOT VIOLATE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Can an attorney, who is named as a defendant in a civil action
along with his former corporate client, reveal client confidences to
plaintiffs' counsel? Should plaintiffs' counsel be disqualified from par-
ticipating in the suit on the grounds that he has received such
21. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
22. The field of taxation represents probably the greatest single area of contact between
individuals and the force of the state. A slight invasion of the right against self-
incrimination in this field has as great and baleful consequences upon the relations
between the individual and the state as does an invasion of that right in the more
dramatic areas of public life.
Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 103 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
23. But cf. United States v. Fisher, 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974), a post-Couch decision
involving the same fact pattern as Kasmir but dealing with a non-criminal investigation. Cases
which dealt with this issue prior to Couch include United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.
1963); Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451 (8th Cir. 1963); In re Fahey, 300 F.2d 383 (6th
Cir. 1961); United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J. 1959), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d
860 (3d Cir. 1959); Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
CASES NOTED
confidential information? These and other issues are to be examined in
this note in light of the decision in Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire and
Marine Insurance Co. '
Goldberg, an attorney, was involved in the preparation of a
securities registration statement 2 filed on behalf of a client corporation
with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Seven months after the registration statement became effective, Gold-
berg resigned from his law firm in a dispute with its partners over the
non-disclosure of a compensation agreement 3 between the corporation
and the law firm. Immediately after his resignation, Goldberg Yolun-
tarily appeared before the SEC and submitted an affidavit outlining
the firm's activities in these matters. Three months later, in a Form
10-K filed with the SEC and in its annual report to stockholders, the
corporation disclosed for the first time the compensation agreement.
Plaintiffs, two shareholders of the corporation, brought a class
action 4 against the corporation, its law firm, Goldberg, and others.5
Plaintiffs alleged that the registration statement and the prospectus
under which the stock had been issued were materially false and
misleading and in violation of the anti-fraud provisions of the se-
curities laws. 6 Upon learning that he had been named as a defendant in
the suit, Goldberg met with plaintiffs' counsel in an effort to exculpate
himself from liability. In this connection, he gave plaintiffs' counsel a
copy of the affidavit he had previously submitted to the SEC. Satisfied
with Goldberg's explanation of his non-participation in the omission,
plaintiffs moved to drop him as a defendant, which motion was
granted by the court.
Shortly thereafter, the remaining defendants moved to bar plain-
tiffs' counsel and Goldberg from participating in any way in this or
any future action against the corporation involving the same transac-
1. 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1974).
2. On May 31, 1972 Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company made a public offering of
500,000 shares of its stock, pursuant to this registration statement.
3. The agreement included $200,000 in attorneys' fees, a fact that was not disclosed in the
registration statement.
4. Plaintiff Meyerhofer alleged that he sustained an unrealized loss of $1000 on the stock he
purchased. Plaintiff Federman alleged that he sustained a realized loss of $237 and an unrealized
loss of $900 on the stock he purchased.
5. The action was brought under the following legal theories: violations of various sections
of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970), the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1970), rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974), and common law negligence,
fraud, and deceit.
6. Approximately five months after plaintiffs brought suit, the SEC filed a complaint seeking
to enjoin the law firm, which had prepared the registration statement, from violating the
securities laws through an alleged scheme to obtain undisclosed finders fees. The SEC charged
the firm with violations of the securities laws by, among other things, failing to disclose the
written compensation agreements and by filing materially false and misleading registration
statements. In addition, the SEC asked for a mandatory injunction requiring the law firm to
make disclosure with respect to any public offering of securities and any other filings with the
SEC. SEC v. Sitomer, Sitomer and Porges, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
94,184 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 19, 1973).
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tions. In addition, defendants moved to dismiss the complaint without
prejudice and to enjoin plaintiffs' counsel and Goldberg from further
disclosing confidential information about the corporation to others.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York granted the motions and held that both Goldberg and counsel for
plaintiffs had breached the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility:
the former by revealing client confidences and by not avoiding an
appearance of impropriety, the latter by encouraging and participating
in the revelation. 7 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held, reversed in part and affirmed in part: An
attorney who is named as a defendant in a civil action along with his
former corporate client is allowed to reveal certain of his client's
confidences to counsel for plaintiffs in order to defend himself against
charges of wrongdoing. Because there was no violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the defendant-attorney was not involved
in a tainted relationship with counsel for plaintiffs. Accordingly,
neither disqualification of plaintiffs' counsel from participating in the
suit nor dismissal of the complaint without prejudice was justified.
However, the defendant-attorney could properly be enjoined from
acting as a party-plaintiff or as an attorney for a party-plaintiff in any
action arising out of the same facts and could properly be enjoined
from disclosing material information except on discovery or at trial.
Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 497 F.2d 1190
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3274 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1974).8
The Code of Professional Responsibility of the American Bar
Association sets forth ethical standards and guidelines of conduct for
practicing attorneys. 9 Canon 4 of the Code states that "a lawyer should
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."' 0 In connection with
this canon, the disciplinary rules mandate that a lawyer shall not
reveal a confidence or secret of his client, nor use a confidence or secret
of his client to the disadvantage of the client or for the advantage of
himself. I' The rationale behind this rule is that the fiduciary relation-
ship existing between a lawyer and his client and the proper function-
7. Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC.
L. REP. 94,152 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). A summary of the lower court's opinion will be found by
reference to this citation. The full text of the memorandum opinion is unpublished at this time.
8. In their petition for certiorari, petitioners contended that allowing the plaintiffs and their
attorneys to continue to prosecute their claims compromises the fairness, or the appearance of
fairness, of federal court proceedings. CCH FED. SEC. L. REPORTS, No. 553 (Sept. 25, 1974).
9. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT.
10. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 4.
11. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(B) provides that with certain exceptions:
A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third
person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 4-101(B).
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ing of the legal system require that a client be secure in his belief that
his lawyer will never disclose secrets confided in him.' 2
The import of Meyerhofer lies in the context of a recent trend of
expanding responsibilities of securities attorneys.13 While no other
cases have interpreted the canons of ethics with regard to an
attorney-defendant's right to reveal the confidences of his former
client, there is a line of cases bearing some similarity to the instant
decision. The cases generally involve factual situations in which an
attorney participates in litigation, either as a party-plaintiff or as
counsel to plaintiff, aginst one of his former clients. Typically, the
issues presented to the court are whether the attorney should be
disqualified from participating in the litigation 14 and whether he
should be enjoined from disclosing confidential information acquired
during the prior representation.
In order to protect the confidentiality of communications between
attorney and client, the courts have generally disqualified an attorney
whenever any substantial relationship may be shown between the
subject matter of the attorney's former representation and that of a
subsequent adverse representation.' 5 Exemplifying this "substantial
relationship" test is Richardson v. Hamilton International Corp. 16 in
which the court held that an attorney was barred under Canon 4 of the
Code from bringing a class action and a stockholders' derivative suit
against a company he had previously represented in proceedings before
the SEC and against certain of its directors and officers. Likewise, in
Hall v. A Corp., '7 the court determined that an attorney violated
Canon 4 by bringing a stockholders' derivative action against his
former client. Canon 4 is breached, the court emphasized, whenever
an attorney would be required to do anything in present litigation
which might adversely affect his former clients in a matter in which he
formerly represented them or whenever he would be required to use
against his former clients any knowledge or information acquired
through his former relationship with them. 18 To remedy the breach,
12. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 4, EC 4-1. See United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
13. See notes 30-35 infra and accompanying text.
14. The power of a court to disqualify lawyers from participation in a case is based on the
court's general supervisory powers. Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
15. See, e.g., Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972); John Doe
v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Hall v. A Corp., 453 F.2d 1375
(2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam); T.C. & Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
16. 469 F.2d 1382 (3d Cir. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as Richardson].
17. 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as A Corp.].
18. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York presented a test for
determining whether an attorney's actions run counter to the dictates of Canon 4:
The test under the canon is whether in this litigation . . . [the attorney] would be
required to do anything which might injuriously affect his former clients in any matter
in which he formerly represented them, or whether he would be called upon to use
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the court enjoined plaintiff and his co-counsel from acting as counsel
in any action arising out of the same facts upon which the litigation
was based and from disclosing any secret or confidential information
obtained by plaintiff during his representation of the former client. 9
The cases discussed above led to the application of a "strict
prophylactic rule" in both Ernle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 20 and
in Motor Mart, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc.
21
to prevent any possibility, however slight, that confidential
information acquired from a client during a previous rela-
tionship may subsequently be used to the client's
disadvantage. 22
Of concern to the courts in these cases was the deleterious consequence
of not strictly enforcing high ethical standards. A client who fears that
information he reveals to his lawyer on one day may be used against
him subsequently would not be inclined to discuss his problems freely
with his lawyer. The need to discourage this type of response was
accordingly emphasized by the courts.
Against this background of case law, the Meyerhofer decision was
reached. Unlike the cases before it, Meyerhofer involved a balancing
of the interests of an attorney in defending himself agaipst charges of
wrong-doing with the interests of the attorney's former client in the
preservation of its confidences and secrets.
Initially the court of appeals addressed itself to Canon 4 and
Canon 923 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to determine
whether Goldberg's meetings and discussions with counsel for plain-
tiffs constituted a violation thereof. The court noted that Goldberg had
associated with and made certain disclosures to plaintiffs' counsel,
which actions were contrary to the ethical precepts of preservation of
client confidentiality and avoidance of the appearance of impropriety.
The court of appeals then focused on the "right of self-defense" excep-
tion to client confidentiality which provision the District Court had not
taken into account. This exception provides that a lawyer may reveal
"confidences or secrets necessary . . . to defend himself . . . against an
against these former clients any knowledge or information acquired through his former
connection with them.
John Doe v. A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352, 1355 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
19. Further, the court enjoined plaintiff and his co-counsel from contacting any other
shareholders of the corporation for purposes of inducing them to commence or intervene in any
action arising out of the same facts.
20. 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as Emle,Industries].
21. 359 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The court followed the "strict prophylactic rule" of
Ernle Industries in enforcing Canon 4 by granting defendants' motion to disqualify plaintiff's
counsel from appearing in the suit. The decision is notable in that counsel was disqualified
without a finding of a breach of good conduct on the part of the attorney and without a finding of
any violation of the Code. This holding apparently is an extension of the "strict prophylactic rule"
for in Ernle Industries the actions of the attorney were found to be in violation of Canon 4.
22. Emle Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
23. Canon 9 states that "a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impro-
priety." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 9.
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accusation of wrongful conduct."24 The court determined that "this is
exactly what Goldberg had to face when, in their original complaint,
plaintiffs named him as a defendant who wilfully violated the se-
curities laws."'25 Because he faced substantial potential liability as well
as damages to his reputation, the court opined that "[u]nder these
circumstances Goldberg had the right to make an appropriate disclos-
ure with respect to his role in the public offering."'2 6
Having determined that the method used by Goldberg to make his
disclosure to plaintiffs' counsel was appropriate, 27 the court concluded
that Goldberg had not violated the Code by revealing client's
confidences and secrets. The logical conclusion to be drawn from the
court's holding is that the interests of the attorney in defending himself
should prevail over the interests of his former client in having its
confidentiality maintained.
The second step in the court's determination was an analysis of
prior case law. Implicit in references made to Emle Industries and
Richardson is the premise that to follow these decisions would require
the disqualification of plaintiffs' counsel and Goldberg from acting as
and participating with counsel to plaintiffs in the conduct of the suit.
Contrary to the lower court's opinion, the court of appeals decided that
[T]he irrebuttable presumption of Emle Industries has no
application to the instant circumstances because Goldberg
never sought to "prosecute litigation," either as a party .. or
as counsel for a plaintiff party. 28
Because Goldberg did not represent the interests of the plaintiffs and
had not violated the Code, and thus had not involved plaintiffs'
counsel in a tainted relationship, the determination was made not to
disqualify plaintiffs' counsel.
Submitted to close scrutiny, the court's reasoning appears less
than perfect. In Emle Industries and in Richardson, the rationale for
disqualifying plaintiffs and their counsel was the likelihood that
confidences and secrets of the former client would be used in litigation
against it. Notwithstanding the fact that Goldberg was not a party-
plaintiff nor acted as counsel for plaintiffs, arguably he provided
plaintiffs with information that bolstered their posture in litigation. 29
24. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, CANON 4, DR 4-101(cX3).
25. 497 F.2d at 1195.
26. Id.
27. The court appeared somewhat troubled by the fact that Goldberg gave plaintiffs' counsel
a copy of the affidavit he had filed with the SEC. However, this method of disclosure was
deemed appropriate since, according to the court, 1) Goldberg's situation was highly precarious,
2) Goldberg had consulted with his own attorney and special counsel to the SEC before handing
over the affidavit, and 3) the most effective way for Goldberg to substantiate his story was for
him to disclose the affidavit.
28. 497 F.2d at 1195.
29. This inference can be drawn from the fact that after the meetings between Goldberg and
plaintiffs' counsel, plaintiffs amended their complaint and alleged more specific facts. Id. at 1193.
19751
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Such use of confidential information to the disadvantage of a client is
conduct the courts and the Code seek to prohibit. The distinction
between formally representing the plaintiffs and assisting in their cause
by the disclosure of confidences and secrets of the defendant is, in the
instant circumstances, not well-founded since the former client is
placed in a disadvantageous position in either situation.
In addition, enjoining Goldberg from disclosing any further in-
formation and from acting as plaintiffs' counsel without enjoining
plaintiffs' counsel from prosecuting the suit is not an adequate remedy
for protecting the interests of the defendant-client. Having been the
recipient of confidences and secrets of the defendant-client, plaintiffs'
counsel must be barred from continuing his representation of plaintiffs
else no real protection of client confidentiality has been afforded.
The decision of the court of appeals in Meyerhofer is best under-
stood in light of what has emerged as a new ethic of disclosure in the
field of securities law. 30 Within the last few years, the responsibilities
and liabilities of attorneys in SEC practice have been significantly
expanded by the SEC and the courts. 31
Concomitantly, the traditional viewpoint that a securities
attorney's sole allegiance is to his corporate client has been significantly
eroded. Today the SEC appears to have adopted the view that se-
curities attorneys owe a duty to the investing public that may take
precedence over their duty to corporate clients. Representative of this
aspect of the trend towards greater disclosure is the complaint filed by
the SEC in SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp.32 The basic
30. See Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities of Attorneys in Practice before the SEC:
Disciplinary Proceedings under Rule 2(e) of the Commission's Rules of Practice, 25 MERCER L.
REV. 637 (1974); Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. LAW. 1153 (1972);
Koch, Attorney's Liability: The Securities Bar and the Impact of National Student Marketing, 14
WM. & MARY L. REV. 883 (1973); Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities
Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUM.
L. REV. 412 (1974); A New Ethic of Disclosure-National Student Marketing and the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 661 (1973); Securities and Exchange Commission v.
National Student Marketing Corp.: The Attorney's Duty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 153 (1972).
31. See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973). In Spectrum the SEC
sought an injunction against an attorney who had prepared an opinion letter used to sell
unregistered securities in violation of the registration provisions and anti-fraud provisions of the
securities laws. The court of appeals determined that in assessing the liability of the attorney as
an aider and abettor a negligence standard is sufficient in the context of enforcement proceedings
seeking equitable or prophylactic relief. In so determining, the court stated that "the preparation
of an opinion letter is too essential and the reliance of the public too high to permit due diligence
to be cast aside in the name of convenience." Id. at 542.
32. [1971-72 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 93,360 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 3,
1972).
The SEC alleged that prior to the closing of a corporate merger involving National Student
Marketing Corporation, certain attorneys were informed by the accounting firm certifying the
financial statements that retroactive adjustments to the statements were necessary to accurately
reflect the corporation's financial position. Notwithstanding the receipt of such information, the
attorneys issued opinions that the appropriate steps to a merger had been undertaken and that, to
their knowledge, no violation of securities laws had taken place.
The SEC asserted that the law firms should have refused to issue the opinion letters and
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premise of the SEC in charging certain attorneys and their law firms
with liability is that once an attorney has determined that client
conduct may be in violation of the securities laws, the attorney has a
duty to disclose to the SEC the possible violation.33 As many commen-
tators have noted, 34 such disclosure presents serious problems for the
confidentiality of the attorney-client relationship.
On its face, the Meyerhofer decision appears consistent with this
new ethic of disclosure and in line with the SEC's position in National
Student Marketing. Clearly, counsel for plaintiffs, purchasers of a
corporation's securities, may receive attorney-client confidences and
secrets concerning the corporation from the corporation's former attor-
ney who is made a defendant in the suit. 35 To the extent that they gain
information potentially in support of their cause of action, plaintiff-
investors benefit from such disclosure.. However, it is submitted that
the ultimate result of allowing such disclosure of client confidences is
that full and fair disclosure to the investor regarding the issuance of
securities is impeded rather than promoted.
The consequence of the holding of the court of appeals in
Meyerhofer is the encouraging of attorneys who are bringing suit
against public corporations to name the defendant's counsel, involved
in the issuance of securities, as a party defendant. Joining defendant's
counsel thus might force the revelation of confidential information at
the expense of the counsel's corporate client. Since counsel might in the
future be forced to reveal client confidences in order to clear himself
from charges of wrongdoing, a client justifiably would be fearful that
information communicated in confidence might later be used against
it. This in turn would place corporate clients on their guard as to what
they should or should not reveal to their counsel. Indeed, it is possible
that some clients would not disclose potentially damaging information.
Without such information, counsel would be in a relatively poor posi-
tion to advise his client. More importantly, such information might
never be disclosed to public investors since a reasonable investigation
by counsel in many circumstances would not reveal certain informa-
tion peculiarly within the knowledge of the corporate client. Hence,
the net effect of the court's holding may be to reduce disclosure rather
than to promote dissemination of information to the investing public.
Conversely, had the court of appeals disqualified plaintiffs' coun-
sel from participating in the suit because it had received confidential
information from the corporation's attorney, plaintiffs' counsel would
should have insisted that the financial statements be revised and the shareholders be resolicited.
If that advice had been ignored, the SEC contended, the attorneys should have ceased represent-
ing their respective clients and informed the SEC of the misleading nature of the financial
statements.
33. In Meyerhofer, the court expressly refused to consider the propriety of Goldberg's
disclosures to the SEC.
34. See authorities cited in note 30 supra.
35. 497 F.2d at 1196.
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not be encouraged to join the corporation's counsel as a party defen-
dant. Corporate counsel would not be forced to reveal confidential
information. In fact, had the court of appeals affirmed the lower
court's decision, attorneys in Goldberg's position would not be allowed
to disclose these confidences and secrets. This reaffirmation of the
confidentiality between attorney and client would allay any fear on the
part of the corporate client that its counsel would be forced to reveal
confidential information. This in turn would result in greater disclos-
ure of information to the investing public since corporate counsel
would have better access to and a greater knowledge of the facts
relevant to the issuance of the corporation's securities.
Although, the actual effect of the Meyerhofer decision is not yet
known, it has been shown that it is likely to be inconsistent with the
policy that the court was attempting to promote. It is submitted that at
the very least the court of appeals in its opinion should have addressed
itself to these potential consequences of its holding.
HOWARD B. POSSICK
PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST PRIORITY UNDER
§ 9-312(4) OF THE U.C.C.: FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
REWRITES THE CODE*
American National Bank of Jacksonville on April 8, 1969, exe-
cuted a loan agreement with Machek Farms and took back a security
interest which encumbered all equipment thereafter acquired by
Machek Farms.' The bank filed a financing statement on April 10,
1969.2 Subsequently, Machek Farms purchased farm equipment from
Florida Truck on August 8, 1969, and executed a credit sales agree-
ment to cover the entire purchase price of the equipment. Florida
Truck assigned this credit sales contract to International Harvester
Credit Corporation, which filed a financing statement on September 3,
1969. 3 After Machek Farms defaulted in payments owed to both
creditors, i.e., American National Bank and International Harvester,
Florida Truck repossessed the farm equipment. American National
* Florida adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (1962 version) effective Jan., 1, 1967.
FLA. STAT. chs. 671-80 (1973). [The Uniform Commercial Code will hereinafter be cited as
U.C.C. or the Code.]
1. U.C.C. section 9-204 validates after-acquired property as collateral for a loan. Section
9-204(3) states in pertinent part, "a security agreement may provide that collateral whenever
acquired shall secure all obligations covered by the security agreement." Section 9-204(4) limits
the application of an after-acquired clause.
2. U.C.C. section 9-302 requires a financing statement to be filed to perfect all security
interests with some exceptions stated in subsection (1).
3. By not filing until September 3, 1969, International Harvester did not take advantage of a
special exception to the "first to file, first in right" rule in U.C.C. section 9-312(4), regarding
purchase money security interests in collateral other than inventory. U.C.C. § 9-312(4).
